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Ending unauthorized immigration is at the heart of current federal initia-
tives in both immigration and social policy. The intertwining of these two
areas of policy is nowhere clearer than in the 1996 passage of both the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), better known as Welfare Reform, and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Immigration status
became a key point of differentiation in access to public benefits as cut-
backs were instituted with the stated goal of curtailing undocumented
immigration. The denial of public benefits to limit unauthorized immigra-
tion has a disproportionate impact on those groups with large cohorts of
recent immigrants. In Massachusetts, Latinos1 and Asians are particularly
affected. Because of the link between immigration status and social policy,
even members of the same family may be faced with different sets of
eligibility rules for public services. This “patchwork” of entitlements
brings confusion to both users and providers and ultimately impedes
access to services. This paper focuses on the impact of immigration status
on eligibility and use of human services by immigrants to Massachusetts.2
The paper discusses the policy context for the new restrictions on immi-
grant access to benefits, presents the variety of immigration statuses
present among immigrant groups in Massachusetts, and discusses the
specifics of the relationship between status and service delivery.
he latter half of the twentieth century saw significant change in the
policies that frame immigration to the United States. First are theT
changes that have taken place in relation to the premises of immigration
policy, which changed in 1965 from one focused on “mirroring” the racial/
ethnic makeup of the country to one that abolished national quotas and
established family reunification at its center. The intent of the policy was to
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favor migration from southern and eastern Europe, but it had the consequence
of opening the door to previously curtailed immigration from other countries,
particularly Asian countries. For the first time, the 1965 policies placed
bounds on migration from the Western Hemisphere, but the flow from Latin
America was already well established. By 1999, a full 70 percent of the legal
immigrants to the United States came from Asia and Latin America.3
Second, does the growing share of unauthorized immigration fuel the
changes? For decades, the permeability of the Mexican border has largely
benefited agribusiness in the region. This sector strongly supported foreign
worker programs until they were abolished in the mid 1960s. But their disap-
pearance did not signal the end of the use of Mexican-origin workers by agricul-
tural enterprises in the region, nor did it stop workers from coming across the
border; both continued unabated and largely unregulated, fueling the increase of
unauthorized immigration from Mexico. During the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese,
Irish, and Dominicans and, later, the Central Americans and Colombians joined
the unauthorized flow. These immigrants may have overstayed a tourist, student,
or work visa or may have crossed or been smuggled through the Mexico-United
States border. Family reunification is a common motivator for unauthorized
entry because of the very long waits for visas, especially for extended family
members. Escape from political turmoil and violence is another cause — Central
Americans in the 1980s and Colombians today. But the vast majority of immi-
grants come in order to find work and improve their lives. The Office of Immi-
gration Statistics of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security4 estimated that
there were 7 million undocumented immigrants in the United States in January
2000.5 Mexico is by far the largest source of undocumented immigration;
followed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Honduras, and China.6 Others
estimate as many as 9.3 million undocumented immigrants, or 26 percent of the
total foreign-born population.7
Both the changing national and racial composition of the immigrants and
the large representation of undocumented immigrants fueled the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). A “carrot and stick” policy, IRCA
authorized the legalization of undocumented immigrants then in the United
States and, seeking to break the relationship between employers and undocu-
mented immigrant laborers, created sanctions for employers who repeatedly
hired undocumented immigrants. The policy succeeded in legalizing the status
of 3.3 million persons,8 adding them, and subsequently their families, to the
legal rolls. But loopholes in the policy and corruption in its implementation led
to an increase in unauthorized immigration in subsequent years.9 Efforts to
address the problems posed by IRCA led to a measure that created more
problems by allowing a variety of exceptions to the law in response to domes-
tic needs and advocacy.10 For example, special protections were sought for
countries that would suffer hardship if their nationals living illegally in the
United States were deported in large numbers. This led to the designation of
123
When They Need Help the Most, Public Services for Immigrants
some nationalities as being eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that
exempted them from deportation for six to eighteen months. The designation
is determined periodically by the Attorney General and applies to undocu-
mented immigrants from countries suffering from natural disasters or political
conflicts. Salvadorans and Hondurans are two Latin American groups that
qualify for this protection as do those from Angola, Burundi, Montserrat,
Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.11
In the 1990s, nativist fears joined the fray as proposals emerged to curtail
the flow of immigrants based on economic and cultural concerns. Some
focused on the impact on American society of the “lack of assimilation” of
Latin American immigrants and issues related to language acquisition. The
fear was that large numbers of immigrants would change the nature and
character of U.S. society. The changes in racial and demographic composition
of the population and the growth of bilingualism were often targets. The use
of immigrant labor by industry and the potential for immigrant labor to
displace native workers were also of concern,12 in spite of the very mixed
evidence in support of these positions.13
Intertwining Social and
Immigration Policy
The 1990s also brought unprecedented examples of the intertwining of social
and immigrant policy. Although immigration officers had long looked to
exclude immigrants whom they suspected could become a “public charge,”
there had not been any specific restrictions for legal permanent residents
beyond those imposed for native-born benefit recipients (for example, the forty
quarter requirement for receiving Social Security and Supplemental Security
Income, and income eligibilities for mean-tested programs). But at this time,
social policy was used to buttress failing immigration policy, and anti-immi-
grant sentiment lent credence to the denial of benefits to legal permanent
residents in order to achieve savings under welfare reform.
The coming together of these two sets of policies relies on several argu-
ments. The first is that immigrants, because they tend to be poor, unskilled,
and poorly educated, are likely to be on welfare and to overuse human ser-
vices.14 Different analyses have shown that most immigrants do not overuse
benefits, that once refugees and the elderly are excluded, adult immigrants use
welfare at about the same rate as native adults and that poor immigrants are
less likely to use welfare than native-born poor persons.15 Nevertheless, the
images of the “needy immigrant abusing benefits,” and services to immigrants
as “budget busters” held fast. These lent credence to the assumptions that it
was the benefits themselves that acted as magnets for poor immigrants to
come to the United States and that provided a disincentive for unsuccessful
immigrants to return to their country of origin.16
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The second argument is that immigration can be curtailed by removing the
incentives to emigrate. From this perspective, immigration is seen as a rational
choice on the part of individual immigrants, who respond to the push of
negative conditions in the country of origin and the pull of a better life in the
United States by emigrating. These individual decisions are managed — in
theory — by border controls that respond to an immigration policy that
follows U.S. economic interests, opening the spigot when workers are desired
and closing it during economic downturns. Lax border controls are then
primarily responsible for the entrance of large numbers of immigrants, some-
thing that can be remedied by sharper, more effective interdiction at the
border. Incentives, such as welfare and other benefits, also act as a pull to
immigrants from poor countries, where income opportunities are fewer than
the benefits offered in the United States. From this perspective, immigrants are
seen as making a cost benefit assessment and choosing not only to come to the
United States, but also to settle in particular regions and states where they find
generous benefits.17
Others argue that the interaction through centuries between Latin America
and the United States have made those borders permeable. Some wield history
to make the case, citing the U.S. takeover of Mexican territory, interventions
in the politics and economics of Latin American nations, and direct military
intervention in the Caribbean and Central America.18 Others point to the more
subtle effects of capital penetration and the resulting restructured local econo-
mies, which result in economic and cultural imbalances that promote migra-
tion as a solution.19 The inability of persons to support themselves and their
families due to transformations and restructurings of the economies of their
countries of origin, together with the constructed exalted vision of the United
States, the direct recruitment by U.S. industries, and the pressures from net-
works of relatives already here results in immigrant flows toward the source of
the intervention, the United States. Portes and Rumbaut argue from this
perspective that withholding benefits is ineffective as a mechanism for immi-
gration control because it fails to deal with the social forces that initiate and
maintain the immigrant flows.20 They pose that the way to control unautho-
rized immigration is to reduce the incentives of U.S. employers to use undocu-
mented immigrant labor and increase the incentives for investment and entre-
preneurship in the countries of origin. Benefits and supports for legal immi-
grants who are already in this country are not questioned from this perspec-
tive: immigrants are seen as a necessary element of regional economies, as
contributors to the tax rolls, and as such they are belived to be entitled to
benefits when they need them.
The public debate and the policy shifts began in California with Proposition
187, which was passed by referendum in November 1994. The law barred
undocumented immigrants from access to most government services including
public schools at all levels, public health services (except for emergencies), and
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public social services.21 Most benefits were eventually restored because their
denial was deemed to be in conflict with federal law; This was the case, for
example, in withholding education from undocumented immigrant children.
Nevertheless, the California initiative opened the door to policies that denied
benefits, even to children, as a way to prop up failing immigration policies.
The further intertwining of immigration and social policy took place with
the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 and the immigrant provisions of the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). Reflect-
ing the most restrictive and nativist perspectives, IIRIRA increased border
controls and physical barriers along the Mexican border as well as penalties
for smugglers and it curtailed deportation appeals. But it left employers’
sanctions largely untouched.22 PRWORA zeroed in on the benefit “magnets”:
authorized immigrants arriving after August 1996 lost eligibility for federal
safety net programs for the first five years they were in the United States.
These included programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food
Stamps, Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), housing benefits, and
Medicaid. During these five years, sponsors who signed affidavits of support
for the immigrants are fully responsible for them, after this time, eligibility for
public benefits are to be determined by the states in which they live.
Under political pressure from states with large immigrant populations, in
1997 and again in 1998, Congress reversed some of the harsher 1996 mea-
sures for “qualified aliens,” a new category of immigrant that includes perma-
nent residents, asylees, parolees, Cuban/Haitian entrants, Amerasians, veter-
ans, battered persons, and those who had worked in the United States for ten
years, among others.23 Congress also restored benefits such as SSI to legal
immigrants and Food Stamps to legal immigrant children and the elderly. But
access to these benefits was limited to immigrants who had been in the country
legally by August 1996.
Also at this time, Congress first passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment and
Central American Relief Act (NACARA), which suspends deportation from
the United States of certain Guatemalans, Salvadorans, and nationals of the
former Soviet bloc countries who are undocumented and allows them to apply
for asylum under more lenient rules, making this process a route to legal
residency for these groups. In the United States about 200,000 Salvadorans
and 50,000 Guatemalans were eligible for NACARA.24 Three years later, a
proposal was introduced in Congress to allow students who have been in the
United States for five years, have graduated from high school, and do not have
a criminal record, to apply for a green card. The Development, Relief and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, as this initiative is called, was
making its way through Congressional Committees sponsored in the U.S.
Senate by Utah Republican Orrin Hatch and Illinois Democrat Richard
Durbin. The DREAM act would allow these students to apply for financial aid
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and in-state tuition rates, as well as give them all the benefits accorded an
authorized immigrant.
But the struggle between the forces seeking to open and to limit immigration
has moved in large measure to the states, focusing on issues such as access to
drivers’ licenses, access to higher education for temporary and undocumented
immigrants, and the restoration of benefits for legal permanent residents.
Efforts at liberalizing immigration policy came again to the fore in 2001 as
the new administration of George W. Bush began to address the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement with his Mexican counterpart, Vicente Fox. But the
events of September 11, 2001, not only ended this initiative, they also opened
a new chapter in immigration policy. The bureaucracy that controlled immi-
gration, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), was overhauled,
taken out of the Department of Justice and placed in the new Department of
Homeland Security. Security was now at the center of immigration policy. In
subsequent months, concerns were raised about profiling and the abuse and
the incarceration of immigrants, the latter often without the benefit of counsel
or public hearings.25
Nevertheless, immigration reform continues as a backburner issue for the
Bush administration. In January of 2004, President Bush proposed the devel-
opment of the Temporary Worker Program for immigrant workers.26 Under
this program, employers, after making a good faith effort to find American
workers to fill their jobs, could hire temporary immigrant workers through
this program. Workers could stay for three years and after this time, their
contracts would need to be renewed or they would face returning to their
country of origin. The expectation is that workers will return eventually to
their country of origin.27 Immigrant organizations raised concerns about the
proposal’s lack of a path to legalization as well as concerns about workers’
rights for guest workers, which have historically been weaker than those
afforded to workers in the domestic labor force.28
Common Immigration Statuses
In Massachusetts, 12.2 percent of the population are immigrants and they
account for one out of every six workers in Massachusetts, the seventh highest
ratio in the nation and one that exceeds that of states with traditionally high
numbers of immigrants such as Texas and Illinois.29 Aside from the increasing
share of immigrants, their origins have also changed. European immigrants,
traditionally the strongest of the national cohorts among the foreign-born in
Massachusetts, today account for about 32 percent of all foreign born.30 But
today, Latin Americans and Asians account for 30 percent and 26 percent,
respectively, of the immigrant population of the state.31
Although the exact number of persons affected by the new policies is
difficult to ascertain, we can approximate the impact on different groups by
determining when they arrived in the United States as reported by the 2000
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U.S. Census. A high percentage of Latinos and Asians have come to the United
States recently. Among Latinos, 49.5 percent arrived in the after 1990 and 8.9
percent (or 38,159 persons) were not living in the United States in 1995 (the
year prior to the onset of the federal initiatives). Among Asians, 47.4 percent
of the population have been in the United States since 1990 and 20 percent
(47,599 persons) since 1995. The latter compares to 1.8 percent among whites
and 5.4 percent among blacks.32
In this region, method of entry varies greatly depending on the time and the
circumstance of the migration of each of the groups and of cohorts within
national groups. Latin American immigrants, for example, may come from the
Spanish Caribbean or Central and South America — more than twenty na-
tions.33 In Massachusetts, the largest groups are from the Dominican Republic,
Brazil, Mexico, El Salvador, and Colombia.34 According to Watanabe, Liu and
Lo, there are immigrants from sixteen Asian nations in the Greater Boston
area; the largest groups are Chinese, Indian, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Korean,
and Japanese.35 Some of these groups first came to the United States as refu-
gees escaping war and violence in their countries of origin. Others have come
with work permits to work as professionals and technicians, sometimes to
reunite with family already here. Some groups have come suddenly and in
large numbers (refugees, for example) while others have trickled in over many
years. This layering provides the rich texture of culture, custom, and language
present among these groups of recent immigrants.
But the circumstances under which each group, and even different cohorts
within groups, arrived in the United States is significant also because it is the
mode of entry into the country that determines the immigration status. There-
fore this layering also represents diversity in immigrant statuses among and
within the groups and also great differences in the situations and opportunities
for individual immigrants.
Lawful Permanent Resident Most immigrants enter the United States after
qualifying for one of the preferences available in immigration law, which
include family reunification, employment, investment, international adoptions,
and beneficiaries of the diversity lottery. Many of these persons cross the U.S.
border by airplane or by car and arrive with full authorization to work legally
in the United States. After five years they can become U.S. citizens. Sponsors
of immigrants applying for residency under this rubric must prove that they
can support the immigrant at 125 percent above the federal poverty level for
at least those first five years. Lawful permanent residence is also acquired by
refugees or asylees who have been in the United States for at least a year.
Refugees Refugees are defines as any “person outside his or her country of
nationality who is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution,” on the basis of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.36 Application for refugee status is uaually made from abroad and has
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to be approved by immigration authorities following priorities and in accord
with numerical limits set by the President and Congress. Refugees are eligible
to change their status to that of a lawful permanent resident after one year in the
United States. Unlike the orderly process of legal immigration, refugee flows
often take place in emergency situations and involve large numbers of persons.
The federal government, therefore, funds special assistance to refugees, which
includes relocation assistance, financial aid, medical care, English language
instruction, job placement. Refugees are also entitled to benefits and services on
a par with citizens. Among Southeast Asians, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Lao-
tians, Thai, and Hmong often arrive in the area as refugees.37 In 2002, the
highest number of refugees to the United States were from Europe and Central
Asia (mostly from the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union).38
The designation of refugee status often relies on humanitarian reasons, but
also on foreign policy goals, making this designation often highly controver-
sial; for example, for decades most persons leaving communist countries were
automatically considered refugees, while persons persecuted in countries with
whose governments the United States maintained friendly relations seldom
were able to qualify as refugees. Among Latin Americans, Cubans have
benefited from various refugee categories and other special designations for
over four decades because they seek to leave a communist nation. Persons
persecuted in El Salvador and Guatemala during the war in the 1980s seldom
acquired refugee status; this was the case also among Chileans, Haitians,
Argentineans, and others who fled U.S.-supported governments.
Asylees In contrast to refugees, asylees request asylum from a United States
territory, often at the border, or after having arrived with another status, or
unauthorized. The reason for asylum is similar to that of the refugee (persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). While the
person awaits status determination, usually a drawn-out process, he or she is
eligible for very few supports, but once awarded asylum, asylees can adjust their
status to that of lawful permanent resident after one year in the United States.
Political and ideological priorities and contradictions similar to those found
among the designation of refugees are also a part of the asylum process.
Groups have organized to obtain this relief; for example, Guatemalans and
Salvadorans, with the support of the American Baptist Church, sued the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service and the United States Department of State
claiming that these government agencies were discriminating against Salvador-
ans and Guatemalans.39 The government settled the lawsuit and the settlement,
approved in federal court in January 1991, provided an initial or a new asylum
interview and adjudication under the more lenient asylum regulations, a suspen-
sion of deportation, and an authorization to work. The time limit for application
for asylum is January 3, 1995, for Guatemalans and January 31, 1996, for
Salvadorans. The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act
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(NACARA), signed in 1997 and again in 1999, extends those dates for Guate-
malan and Salvadoran applicants, includes Nicaraguans, Cubans, and persons
from former socialist countries who may have arrived in the United States
undocumented, and also includes authorization for similar relief to spouses and
unmarried children once the initial family member has been granted relief.
Qualifying to apply for NACARA means that a person can go about his or her
life with the expectation of eventually becoming a legal resident of the United
States, with all the implications this status has for the immigrant and his or her
family. But the process is long, often five to seven years.40
Undocumented Persons These persons may have overstayed a tourist, student,
or work visa, or they may have illegally crossed or been smuggled through the
U.S. border. The INS estimated that in January 2000, there were 87,000
undocumented persons in Massachusetts.41 But most persons interviewed for
this article consider that this greatly underestimates the undocumented immi-
grant population presently residing in Massachusetts. Family reunification and
economic hardship were frequently mentioned by interviewees and focus
group members as reasons for entering the country without authorization.
This is by far the most precarious status. These immigrants are vulnerable, not
only because of the potential for deportation but also because of the way that
fear of discovery weaves into every aspect of their lives from where and how
they work, to the level of interaction they have with community institutions,
including schools, healthcare providers, and human service settings. It colors
the relationships they have with neighbors and co-workers, with landlords and
others in authority.
In this case also, advocacy efforts by immigrant groups and the support of
their countries of origin have led to special immigration programs. This is the
case of persons from some Latin American and African countries who are
provided relief under the Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Persons with TPS
are not considered lawful immigrants by the U.S. Government, and are autho-
rized to be in the United States because the U.S. Congress has granted them
temporary protection. This status is awarded to groups from countries in
which conditions pose a danger to personal safety due to armed struggle or an
environmental disaster.42 Grants of TPS are made for renewable periods of six
to eighteen months and provide protection from deportation and a work
permit; the designation of temporary protection does not lead to the award of
permanent residency. Therefore immigrants with this type of status live in a
sort of limbo fraught with uncertainty and constant legal and bureaucratic
maneuvers that expose them to abuse and exploitation.43 44
A variety of immigration statuses coexist within these groups and even
within families. For persons other than U.S. permanent residents, immigration
is a reality that must be managed on a daily basis. The immigrant with TPS,
for example, must be vigilant when it comes to the bewildering paperwork
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that is involved, as one small error can mean the difference between staying in
the United States and being deported.
By far the most vulnerable is the undocumented immigrant. Being undocu-
mented affects where immigrants work and the working conditions to which
they are exposed. Status also affects their ability to qualify for federal and
state benefits and services for themselves and for their children — even their
U.S. born children. Because immigration status and time of entry varies widely
among and within the groups, members arrive under differing policy condi-
tions. Immigration status can vary even within families, leading to what Fix
and Zimmerman refer to as mixed status families.45 In Massachusetts, the most
common scenario of mixed status families is that the parents are temporary
(TPS) or undocumented immigrants and the children are U.S. citizens.46
National estimates are that three out of every four children in immigrant
families are U.S. citizens.47 Yet, because of the insecure circumstances facing
members of their families, many of these children, regardless of their citizen-
ship, share the same fate as their undocumented siblings and parents.
Access to Benefits
Under the new regime of IIRIRA and PRWORA, the time of entry and the
designation of an immigrants’ status as that of a “qualified alien” are the key
determinants of an immigrant’s eligibility for public benefits. This is in addi-
tion to the age, income, disability, or other specific program eligibility require-
ments. “Qualified aliens” are (1) Lawful Permanent Residents; (2) refugees,
asylees, and persons granted withholding of deportation, conditional entry (in
effect prior to April 1, 1980); (3) Cuban/Haitian entrants; and (4) battered
spouses and children with a pending or approved petition for an immigrant
visa, whose need for benefits has a substantial connection to the battery or
cruelty. Not qualified immigrants include all non-citizens who do not fit within
the “qualified” immigrant categories. In general, the date that splits immigrant
eligibility, even for “qualified” immigrants, is August 22, 1996.
An immigrant needs to be a “qualified” immigrant AND have been residing
legally in the United States before the cut off date of August of 1996 to qualify
for most federal benefits; qualified immigrants who arrived after that date
must wait five years from the time of entry to qualify for any federal public
benefits. In the case of applicants who successfully gain asylum and permanent
residency, the wait is usually five years from the time asylum is granted.
Eligibility for public benefits for those on temporary statuses is minimal and
there is no eligibility for public federal benefits for the undocumented.
One of the features of PRWORA was the devolution of authority to the
states regarding the provision of benefits for immigrants. Under this authority,
Massachusetts initially maintained eligibility for some services. In addition,
persons protected under NACARA and under TPS are considered Permanent
Residence Under Color of Law (PRUCOL) in Massachusetts. This allows
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access to state benefits that federal programs do not allow. In 1996, even in
the face of the federal restrictions, Massachusetts maintained eligibility for
emergency cash assistance, the state portion of the Medicaid program
(MassHealth), and Food Stamps for legal permanent residents, for newly
arrived legal immigrants during their first five years in the United States, and
for NACARA applicants and those on TPS (because of the more lenient
interpretation of these groups as PRUCOLS). These eligibility requirements
were maintained until the state’s budget crisis in 2003 and 2004, when the
state cut all state-funded MassHealth coverage and Food Stamps for immi-
grants, affecting 10,000 legal immigrant adults.48 These included cuts to
services for elderly and disabled immigrants. At this point, undocumented
immigrants in Massachusetts can send their children to public school, but they
are admitted as international students to higher education institutions and do
not qualify for in-state tuition. Undocumented children and pregnant women
can receive some healthcare benefits and are eligible for WIC nutrition pro-
grams. Others are eligible for emergency healthcare services and hospitaliza-
tion from free care pools.
The curtailment of services to immigrants affects all immigrant groups in
Massachusetts, but particularly those with large number of recent immigrants.
The changes in policy also have great impact on those groups with a large
number of immigrants on temporary status or undocumented immigrants.
Perhaps the areas most affected by the new restrictions are those related to the
range of programs for poor families. Table 1 provides a glimpse at the way
status and program eligibility interact in relation to welfare programs in Massa-
chusetts. The charts show how different immigration statuses determine the
public benefits for which individuals are eligible. Lawful Permanent Residents
(LPRs), who resided in the United States in August of 1996, and refugees are
eligible for the widest array of benefits. Restrictions apply to lawful permanent
residents who arrived after that date as well as to persons seeking asylum (for
example under NACARA) and those on TPS. The undocumented are eligible for
few public benefits and usually only in an emergency situation.
PRWORA offers states some discretion. In the case of welfare benefits in
Massachusetts, for example, immigrants who arrived after the cut off date
are eligible for some state welfare programs (TAFDC, EA) if they are 18 or
younger and, if over 18, they are eligible after the five-year waiting period,
but they qualify immediately for others such as Emergency Aid for the
Elderly, the Disabled, and Children (EAEDC). The state also provides access
to Emergency Assistance to families with at least one qualifying member (a
citizen or lawful permanent resident), which means that a family made up of
persons under temporary protection or undocumented and that has a Ameri-
can–born child may apply for benefits under this program if they meet other
program requirements. EAEDC is available to asylum applicants as well as
those under temporary protection.
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Table 1
Eligibility for Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, Federal
Food Stamps, and federal and state welfare programs by immigrants
with immigration statuses common among Latin American
immigrants in Massachusetts.
Notes: (1) Must have entered before 8/22/96 and status must have been granted on or
after that date. (2) Emergency Assistance can be made available to households that include
at least one member that is a citizen or a LPR.
Sources: a National Immigration Law Center, 2002; b Massachusetts Department of
Transitional Assistance, 2003
Legal restrictions are an obvious institutional barrier to access to benefits
brought about by the intertwining of immigration and social policy that took
place under PWORA and IIRIRA. But immigrants face other restrictions on
the use of services that are more subjective but still prevent eligible recipients
from receiving the support to which they are entitled. Now that eight years has
passed since this legislation was enacted, studies are starting to detect a
significant decline in the use of cash transfers, health services, and other
services by immigrants who need them and are qualified to receive them.49
As previously discussed, immigrant families encounter a decentralized public
social support system with many eligibility guidelines administered by different
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forms of government. There is often confusion as to what family member is
eligible for what public benefit. Clearly determining eligibility for an assortment
of benefits is not an easy process, particularly for newcomers who have diffi-
culty with the language. Without support from other immigrants and commu-
nity-based organizations, especially health centers, individuals may never
complete the application process for benefits they are entitled to receive.
The fear of discovery on the part of undocumented immigrants is another
restriction to be overcome, what a provider in East Boston referred to as
“living in the shadows . . . not being seen, not being acknowledged, not being
respected, and not being there.”50 The undocumented never know who might
report them, and those with TPS and NACARA are reminded of the transient
nature of their status. For individuals with these statuses, the fear of discovery
remains front and center as they apply for services for their eligible family
members. In particular this affects access to services for American-born
children in mixed-status families. They have low participation in benefit
programs although they are eligible for them.51
Finally, legal immigrants also resist using services for fear of becoming a
public charge, a status that will later harm their ability to obtain more secure
legal status. To avoid becoming a public charge, immigrants at times abstain
from using public benefits during these five years. By not fully understanding the
public charge requirement, eligible immigrants fail to apply for eligible services.
Hard and soft institutional barriers combine with well-known language and
cultural barriers to prevent access and use of services by immigrants. Particu-
larly in the areas of physical and mental health, finding a linguistically and
culturally competent provider after a person becomes eligible for services can
prove difficult. Recent federal guidelines by the Department of Health and
Human Services (August 2000) and the Massachusetts Emergency Room
Interpreter Bill are major improvements, but immigrants need many other
services as they struggle with limitations caused by language in the areas of
childcare and schools, the legal system, the Department of Social Services, and
other human services agencies.
Conclusion: When They Need
Help the Most
Cutbacks and policies heap hardship on recent immigrants, even on those who
are here legally, since they are denied assistance at a crucial time in their
adjustment to their new home. The literature on the social consequences of
immigration focuses on the harshness of the process of immigration and of the
adaptation of immigrants to their new surroundings. How an immigrant leaves
home and makes his or her way to the United States is significant in the early
adaptation of the newcomer, but factors related to the way the immigrant is
received — and his or her place in the new society — influence his or her
subsequent experience and shape the perception of the experience and the
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psychosocial adjustment of the immigrant52 and even the social and economic
outcomes of the second generation.53 Census information provides evidence
that among immigrants in Massachusetts there are persons at every stage of
the process of adjustment. They include new arrivals, persons settling, some
with already established routines that incorporate them at different levels into
U.S. society. Some who immigrated long ago may have stable situations while
others who have also been in the United States for many years still struggle to
attain a certain level of stability. Others are here on temporary status or
undocumented. In the case of recent immigrants, the stresses due to the pro-
cess of immigration segue into problems related to the immigrants’ status and
the difficulties they encounter in the process of adaptation and incorporation
to the United States due to language and cultural differences.
Recent policies have favored a vision of immigration that ignores the social
dynamics of population flows and the fundamental interaction between the
origin and the destination of the flow. This blind spot continues to pull policy
in the direction of ever stronger border controls and punitive measures for
those who succeed in entering the country nevertheless. Of late, those punitive
measures have been accompanied by an increasingly negative vision of immi-
grants, particularly immigrants from poor countries, that is mostly unfounded
but that now is even more confounded in the environment created by the
aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. Together, they obscure what
immigrants contribute to their new country and what immigrants and their
children require to have a successful adjustment.
But even before this critical time, other “blind spots” have provided a
partial view of the process of immigration and adaptation. The focus, as we
point out at the start of this paper, has been on the restrictions deployed to
curtail immigration at the border and beyond, though most immigrants are
here legally. On the way, policy has ignored the process of adaptation and
adjustment of these immigrants and the interest society has in that this process
is as fruitful as it possibly can be. There is evidence from the outcomes ob-
served among contemporary refugees that a range of services can be support-
ive of a more optimal adjustment.
The fact is, today’s immigrants may come here in response to federal policy,
but they live in localities that are hard hit by budget restrictions and unrecep-
tive to their needs. The results are clear: many immigrants experience a multi-
tude of barriers that impact access and availability of health and social ser-
vices. Many are afraid to seek services to which they are entitled. New immi-
grants go without services at the time when they need them the most.
Many of the social services we have today in our communities emerged
from the recognition at the early part of the twentieth century that society
needed to pay attention to the process of adjustment of immigrants. The great
settlement houses of Boston and of most of the northeastern urban areas,
precursors of contemporary human service agencies, reflected this perspective.
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It was in the interest of society that immigrants make an adjustment that
allowed them to make a living, raise their children, and contribute to society.
Although, at times this turned into a violent process of “Americanization,”
there are also many examples of the processes of social support and institution
building that emerged from these times.
Today, the lack of a clear immigration policy leaves attention to the needs of
immigrants — at the time they need it the most — to the vagaries of local
budgets and, yes, the use of social policy to buttress failing immigration policies,
as happened in 1996. There is evidence that the wheel is turning toward another
review of immigration policy. This time one can only hope that it includes a
broader, more complex vision of “immigrant policy,” one that supports a
successful adaptation of immigrants to their new environment.
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I accepted a position as a housing advocate while my family
and I were wrapping up an eleven-month stay in the
Commonwealth’s homeless shelter system.  At the same time we
acquired our Section 8 voucher. Homelessness had unsuspectingly
crept into our lives.  We were a young, vibrant family with four
children and expecting our fifth, working toward financial indepen-
dence. When my husband’s paycheck sharply decreased to poverty
level standards, we swiftly depleted our slight savings.  With partial
payment due, the landlord served us with a Notice to Quit and we
were ousted from our home, then owing just over $1,000 in rent.
We were directed to the Department of Transitional Assistance to
seek out emergency shelter.  It was Christmas Eve, 2001.
We were assigned to a local hotel by the DTA, occupying two
rooms. I felt ashamed when asked to sign the invoice of $95 per
night, per room.  Our stay of 45 days cost $8,550. Then we were
placed in a scattered-site shelter. This arrangement allowed us to be
licensed, temporary occupants of an apartment rented by the agency
directly from a private landlord. The rent paid to the landlord was
$1,500 per month.  We stayed there for ten and a half months while
we looked for affordable housing, at a direct charge to the state of
$15,750.  That brought our total cost of basic shelter to $23,750.
This figure does not include such costs as supportive services and
utilities that could easily add another $10,000 to the sum.  I could
not help but think that an upfront investment of $1,000 could have
saved my family from eviction, before it was a crisis. If an argument
based in moral sense could not save a family from experiencing the
devastation of homelessness, could an argument be made based on
economic sense?
Diane Sullivan
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